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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) UTAH CODE ANNOT.

Plaintiff/Appellant

originally filed this appeal with the Utah Supreme Court, but that
court transferred this matter to this Court on January 23, 1990,
pursuant to Rule 4A(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
This is an appeal from an order of summary judgment and dismissal
with prejudice which was granted by the Second District Court in
favor of Defendant/Respondent.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals, Defendant/Respondent John Deere Insurance Company herein
sets forth its Statement of Issues Presented for Review.
1.

Is the Certificate of Insurance which STUART

received a part of the writings constituting the entire insurance
agreement between JOHN DEERE and STUART?
2.

Does STUART'S failure to move to strike the

affidavits in support of JOHN DEERE'S summary judgment motion,
combined with its failure to move for further discovery pursuant
to Rule 56(f) Utah R. Civ. P. constitute a waiver of any formal or
evidentiary defects contained in the affidavit of Deborah
Kamenetzky?
3.

Is the insurance agreement unambiguous, such that

this Court need not consider parol evidence?
4.

Did the lower court commit reversible error when it

determined that insurance coverage under the Master Policy and the
-6-

Certificate of Insurance ended when STUART terminated the securityagreement/ satisfied its debt, and got credit for the unearned
premium?
5.

If the insurance agreement is ambiguous, did the

lower court commit reversible error when it considered an
affidavit containing parol evidence, which evidence is undisputed,
and to which affidavit STUART neither objected nor moved to strike?
6.

Did § 31A-21-303 or § 70C-6-304 UTAH CODE ANNOT.

require JOHN DEERE to give STUART notice that the insurance
coverage ended upon STUART'S payoff of the insured property?
7.

Is STUART entitled to insurance coverage for which

it did not pay?

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) UTAH CODE ANNOT. (1953 as amended) (Addendum B)
§ 31A-21-303 UTAH CODE ANNOT. (1953 as amended) (Addendum C)
§ 70C-6-304 UTAH CODE ANNOT. (1953 as amended) (Addendum D)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Proceedings Below
Plaintiff/Appellant STUART, INC. ("STUART"), a Utah
corporation which was involuntarily dissolved by the Utah State
Department of Business Regulation on March 1, 1987 (R. 138)
commenced this action by filing a complaint against
Defendant/Respondent JOHN DEERE INSURANCE CO. ("JOHN DEERE") on
August 1, 1988 (R. 1-13).
The Complaint contained one cause of action.

STUART

complained of JOHN DEERE's alleged failure to abide by the terms
of an insurance policy which STUART alleged was contained within a
Retail Instalment Contract ("Contract") (R. 2). The Retail
Instalment Contract covered STUART'S purchase of a John Deere
backhoe from Scott Machinery Company in Salt Lake City, Utah (R.7).
JOHN DEERE filed a motion for summary judgment on
March 3, 1989 (R. 24-25).

JOHN DEERE also filed a memorandum of

points and authorities (R. 26-33) and initially, two affidavits in
support of its motion, those of Terry Digman (R. 34-44) and Howard
Payne (R. 45-56).

On or about March 14, 1989, and at the request

of STUART, JOHN DEERE consented to extend the time within which
STUART could respond to JOHN DEERE's motion (R. 57). On April 17,
1989 JOHN DEERE filed the Amended Affidavit of Howard Payne, which
certified that the insurance policy attached to it was the policy
in effect at the time STUART alleges it suffered its loss (R.
63-92).

-8-

On May 16, 1989 (over 10 weeks after JOHN DEERE filed its
motion), STUART filed its Statement of Points in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of
Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 93-109).

On

June 15, 1989, JOHN DEERE filed its Reply Brief in Support of its
motion for summary judgment and in opposition to STUART'S cross
motion for summary judgment (R. 117-127).

Attached to this Reply

Brief were the Affidavit of Deborah M. Kamenetzky (R. 128-137) and
a certified copy of the March 1, 1987 Certificate of Dissolution
by which STUART was no longer recognized as a legal entity in Utah
(R. 138). STUART's Reply Memorandum in support of its Cross
Motion was filed on June 22, 1989 (R. 143-149).
On August 10, 1989 JOHN DEERE filed a Supplemental
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 165-175).

That memorandum included a copy of

a very recent memorandum opinion made, after trial to a jury, by
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas on
June 19, 1989 ("Arkansas Decision").

STUART replied to the

Arkansas Decision on August 17, 1989 (R. 176-180).

Finally, on

August 22, 1989 JOHN DEERE filed a motion for leave to set up
counterclaim in the event its motion for summary judgment was
denied (R. 181-183).
After all supporting and opposing memoranda had been
filed, the Second District Court heard oral argument on
September 5, 1989.

At the hearing on September 5, 1989, the lower

court took the motions under advisement (R. 184).
-9-

On September 18, 1989, the lower court ruled on the
pending motions for summary judgment.

The lower court granted

JOHN DEERE1s motion for summary judgment and denied STUART'S cross
motion for summary judgment (R. 195-197).

The lower court later

ruled that JOHN DEERE*s motion for leave to set up counterclaim
was moot (R. 202).
At the lower court's direction, and pursuant to Rule
4-504 UCJA, JOHN DEERE prepared and served its proposed Order of
Summary Judgment and Dismissal of Complaint with Prejudice
(-Order") to counsel for STUART on September 21, 1989 (R. 207).
STUART made no objections to the form of the proposed order, and
the lower court signed and entered the Order on October 4, 1989
(R. 206).
STUART filed its Notice of Appeal on October 27, 1989
(R. 208). On November 17, 1989 STUART moved the Utah Supreme
Court for summary disposition in its favor pursuant to Rule
10(A)(3) of the rules of that Court.

After JOHN DEERE filed its

Memorandum in Opposition to that motion, the Utah Supreme Court
denied STUART'S motion on December 22, 1989.
Statement pf thg Fectg
JOHN DEERE is an insurance company which provides
insurance for John Deere & Company (-Deere & Company-), the
manufacturers of heavy equipment (R. 128). One of the policies by
which JOHN DEERE insures Deere & Company is a Retail Instalment
Sales Floater Policy No. IM-14319 (hereafter -Master Policy")
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(R. 128). The Master Policy insures property owned by Deere &
Company, and property sold under contract wherever that property
is located (R. 68, 77). The effective date of the Master Policy
is January 1, 1982 (R. 128). The Master Policy originally
included an "Attachment of Insurance- provision, which provided,
in part, as follows,
This insurance terminates when the actual maturity date
of the note is reached or the date on which the security
interest of John Deere in said equipment terminates,
whichever first occurs.
(R. 128, 68). This shall hereafter be referred to as the
"termination language."
In 1983, it was the agreement and intention of the
parties to the Master Policy, JOHN DEERE and Deere & Company, that
the Master Policy would be changed to cover not only the actual
financed merchandise, but to cover any additional security in
favor of Deere & Company (R. 128). This additional security
insurance amendment to the Master Policy was the only change
contemplated and agreed to by the parties (R. 129). Initially, it
was not put into writing.

Between 1983 and 1989, JOHN DEERE

honored all claims for loss of or damage to non-financed
merchandise and equipment, notwithstanding the fact that no
formal, written amendment was made to that portion of the Master
Policy (R. 129).
In June, 1988, Deborah Kamenetzky, an in-house attorney
for JOHN DEERE, undertook to revise the language in the Attachment
of Insurance provision to reflect the intention of the parties
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regarding non-financial merchandise (R. 129). This change in the
Master Policy was not formalized by writing until January, 1989
(10 months after STUART suffered its loss and 5 years after it
purchased the insurance) (R. 2, 129). By a clerical error, the
termination language was omitted from the amended Attachment of
Insurance provision (R. 129, 131, 81).
Because John Deere's security interest in the various
machinery and equipment it sells under contract will vary per the
terms of each and every individual contract, the Master Policy is
not sent to them.

Rather, individual certificates of insurance

are sent to each of the additional insured, such as STUART (R. 9).
On December 20, 1983 STUART purchased a 1984 John Deere
backhoe ("Backhoe") from Scott Machinery Company in Salt Lake
City, Utah.

This purchase was primarily on credit, since STUART

paid $23,406.50 of the $82,266.50 sales price (R. 7). STUART
executed a Retail Purchase Instalment Contract (••Contract'*) by
which it applied for credit from the John Deere Industrial
Equipment Company to finance the remaining $62,194.29 of the
purchase price (R. 7). The Contract provided for monthly payments
to be made to John Deere by STUART, beginning on April 1, 1984 and
ending on April 1, 1988 (R. 7). John Deere Industrial accepted
the Contract on March 7, 1984 (R. 7).
The Contract also required STUART to obtain physical
damage insurance for the Backhoe (R. 8). The reason for this
requirement was simple —

until John Deere Industrial was paid
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off, it wanted to make sure that there was adequate insurance on
the Backhoe to protect its security interest.

The Contract

contained the following language:
If physical damage insurance is purchased by holder, I
(we) will be furnished a certificate which describes the
insurance. Such insurance shall terminate if the
indebtedness is discharged, or if the holder's security
interest in the equipment terminates, . . . or at the end
of the term of the contract. . . . Any refunds or return
premiums shall be applied toward existing indebtedness
hereunder with the excess, if any, returned to me (us).
(R. 8).
STUART elected to purchase insurance from JOHN DEERE and
paid a premium in the amount of $2,972.29 (R. 7). After John
Deere Industrial accepted the Contract, it sent a Certificate of
Physical Insurance ("Certificate of Insurance") to STUART.

After

STUART received the Certificate of Insurance, and presumably read
its terms and description of insurance, STUART did not cancel the
insurance and purchase insurance with different terms.

STUART

elected to keep the Backhoe insured under the terms described in
the Certificate of Insurance.
STUART's certificate of insurance set forth the relevant
dates of the Master Policy as it applied to STUART.

The effective

date of the insurance as to STUART was December 20, 1983, the date
of purchase (R. 9). In addition to this information, the
Certificate of Insurance repeated to STUART what the Contract had
stated:
This certifies that the equipment . . . is insured . . .
until the expiration date shown above unless the
insurance is terminated sooner as provided in the next
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sentence. The insurance shall terminate immediately
without notice if any one of the following events occurs:
the indebtedness is discharged; John Deere's security
interest in the property which is the subject of the
contract terminates; . . . or the Retail Instalment Sales
Floater Policy under which John Deere has purchased the
insurance is terminated.
(R. 9).
STUART never relied upon the Master Policy, nor did
STUART even see a copy of the Master Policy until after this
litigation commenced (R. 196, 206) (See, also, STUART'S Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary
Disposition, p. 6). In its Complaint, STUART alleged that the
Contract was the insurance policy.

•'Defendant issued to Plaintiff

a Physical Damage Insurance Policy, No. 870276283AA. . . .H
(R. 2). The Contract is not the insurance agreement.
On or about January 20, 1988, STUART contacted John Deere
Credit Services and requested a payoff amount (R.34).

STUART was

advised that the Backhoe could be paid off in full by February 10,
1988 for the sum of $5,578.72 (R. 34). On February 5, 1988,
STUART paid $5,578.72 to John Deere Credit, which included a
credit for the unearned insurance premium (R. 35).
On March 9, 1988 the Backhoe was destroyed by fire of
unknown origin (R. 2). STUART made a claim against what it
thought was the insurance policy, which claim was denied by JOHN
DEERE for the reason that upon STUART'S early payoff, the
indebtedness was discharged and Deere & Company no longer had a
security interest in the Backhoe (R. 2). STUART then brought its
lawsuit.
-14-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the lower court for the reason
that it correctly ruled as a matter of law that STUART'S
unilateral act of paying the Backhoe off ended insurance coverage
more than one month before the Backhoe was allegedly destroyed*
STUART saw two writings regarding its insurance coverage before it
suffered its loss. One was its sales contract, and the other was
a certificate of insurance.

Each of those writings clearly and

unambiguously told STUART its coverage would end when it paid the
Backhoe off.

STUART received the contract, received the

certificate of insurance, and elected to keep that insurance.

It

had the option to purchase insurance with different terms, and did
not do so.
Now, STUART is grasping at straws, attempting to
establish coverage where there is none.

The largest straw is in

the form of an amendment to the Master Policy —

an amendment

which was not in writing until January, 1989, more than five years
after STUART bought the Backhoe and the insurance.

That amendment

mistakenly omitted certain language similar to that contained in
the Contract and Certificate of Insurance.

The amendment did not

change the language stating insurance ends upon payoff —
merely omitted it.

it

The amendment has no legal effect upon the

policy's termination provisions contained in the writings.
This Court should affirm the lower court's judgment that
the Certificate of Insurance and the Master Policy constitute an
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insurance agreement which ended when STUART fulfilled the
conditions to end coverage . . • payoff of the Backhoe.
DEERE did not cancel the policy.

JOHN

The policy expired by its own

terms, and therefore no notice was required by Utah statute to be
given.

STUART did not pay for coverage beyond February 5, 1988,

and is not entitled to coverage beyond that date.
I.
ARGUMENT
A.

STUART CANNOT MEET THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
STUART cannot demonstrate that the lower court committed

reversible error.

Its opportunity to present evidence meriting a

full trial has passed.

The Utah Supreme Court has recently

reiterated the standard of review on appeals from summary judgment.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 'we consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing
party, and affirm only where it appears there is no
genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact/ or
where, even according to the facts as contended by the
losing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.•
D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989) (citation
omitted).

The "evidence" which this Court must consider is

limited, however, solely to the evidence of record.

The Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure require that when a motion for summary
judgment is supported by specific facts, "an adverse party . . .
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.-

Rule 56(e) Utah R. Civ. P.

JOHN DEERE's motion was supported by specific facts —
the affidavits of Terry Digman, Howard Payne, and Deborah
-16-

Kamenetzky

(R. 34-44, 45-53, 63-92, and 128-137).

STUART did not

and cannot contest any of the facts upon which JOHN DEERE relied
in its motion.

STUART has agreed that there are no issues of

material fact upon which a genuine dispute exists (R. 93-94).
STUART conceded as much when it made its own cross motion for
summary judgment (R. 107). STUART submitted no affirmative
affidavits in opposition to JOHN DEERE1s motion for summary
judgment.

Therefore, there are only legal issues to be resolved

here.
In construing Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which Rule's subsection is worded identically to the
Utah Rule 56(c), the United States Supreme Court has stated:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates
the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party's case, and on which
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In
such a situation, Mthere can be "no genuine issue as to
any material fact, since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's
case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 at 322-323, 106 S. Ct.
2548, at 2552, 91 L.Ed. 265, at 273 (1986).

Although the Utah

Supreme Court has not precisely adopted this position in any
written opinions to date, this Court has cited Celotex with
approval in Reeves v. Geicry Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636,
642 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and in Robinson v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
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B.

THE INSURANCE AGREEMENT UNAMBIGUOUSLY STATES THAT WHEN STUART
PAID THE BACKHOE OFF. COVERAGE ENDED.
The insurance agreement is not ambiguous, for the reason

that all writings, taken together, clearly convey the intent of
the parties that when the indebtedness secured by the Backhoe was
paid off, the Backhoe would no longer be covered by the policy.
1.

Contract Ambiguity is A Question of Law.

STUART makes inconsistent arguments regarding whether a
contract's ambiguity is a factual or legal matter.
page of its Brief, STUART states the following:

On the same

-The issue of

whether a writing that is before the court is an integration
adopted by the parties as the complete expression of their bargain
is a question of fact to be resolved by the jury."
at p. 13). This is not correct.

(STUART Brief

STUART was correct when it later

asserted, on the same page: "Likewise, after a court makes a legal
determination that ambiguities exist in a contract, parol or
extraneous evidence becomes admissible to determine the factual
issue of the parties intentions concerning the ambiguity." (Id.)
(emphasis added).

The Faulkner case cited by STUART is

unequivocal on the point.
1293 (Utah 1983).

Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292,

Contract interpretation, including whether a

contract is ambiguous, is a question of law.
2.

STUART'S Arguments Are Ingenuous In Light Of The
Writings It Had, And The Language Thev Contained.

STUART is before this court arguing it is entitled to the
benefit of a clerical error which omitted language from the Master
Policy, which error was made months after STUART suffered its
-18-

loss, and years after STUART was told what the policy's terms
were.

The only documents STUART ever saw, before this suit

commenced, unequivocally told STUART that insurance coverage would
end when STUART paid the Backhoe off.

The actual language of the

documents, and the context within which they came to STUART'S
attention are important because of the "intention of the parties"
and "meeting of the minds" issues inherent in any contract
interpretation.

A clear picture of the writings at issue is also

important because STUART continues to confuse the Insurance Policy
and the Certificate of Insurance, each of which is a separate
writing, but both of which constitute the insurance agreement
governing the relationship between these parties.
3.

STUART Relied And Continues To Rely Upon The
Certificate Of Insurance.

In its Brief, STUART refers to an "Insurance Contract"
which it defined as the Policy No. IM-14319.
p. 4)

(STUART Brief at

Yet STUART asserts that "the backhoe was to be insured

through April 1, 1988, under such policy."
Policy does not contain an expiration date.

(i£.)

The Master

This is because JOHN

DEERE and Deere & Company, as the insurer and the named insured,
desired that the Master Policy remain in force, as to them, until
either of them cancelled the policy (R. 72). However, different
time periods apply to the many additional insureds, such as
STUART.

Because STUART and the hundreds of other additional

insureds under the Master Policy have different loan terms and
different equipment, JOHN DEERE sends to each of the additional
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insureds a certificate of insurance, similar to that upon which
STUART originally relied when it filed its lawsuit.
When STUART bought the Backhoe, it paid a premium for
insurance, as reflected in the Contract (R. 7). The Contract
clearly informed STUART what it should expect with respect to the
insurance it bought.

That language stated as follows:

If physical damage insurance is purchased by holder, I
(we) will be furnished a certificate which describes the
insurance. Such insurance shall terminate if the
indebtedness is discharged, or if the holder's security
interest in the equipment terminates, . . . or at the end
of the term of the contract. . . . Any refunds or return
premiums shall be applied toward existing indebtedness
hereunder with the excess, if any, returned to me (us).
(R. 8). Therefore, immediately upon the Backhoe's purchase,
STUART was told that the insurance it bought would end upon the
debt being satisfied, and that any unused premium would be
returned or credited.
The next and only other insurance related writing STUART
received prior to its claim for loss of the Backhoe was the
Certificate of Insurance.

That Certificate contained the

following language:
This certifies that the equipment . . . is insured . . .
until the expiration date shown above unless the
insurance is terminated sooner as provided in the next
sentence. The insurance shall terminate immediately
without notice if any one of the following f events occurs:
the indebtedness is discharged; John Deere s security
interest in the property which is the subject of the
contract terminates; . . . or the Retail Instalment Sales
Floater Policy under which John Deere has purchased the
insurance is terminated.
(R. 9). The Certificate of Insurance described the term of the
insurance.

The insurance was to run to the expiration date or
-20-

until the indebtedness was discharged, the security interest in
the Backhoe terminated, or the Contract was terminated, all of
which took place on February 5, 1988•

If STUART had paid the

Backhoe off three years earlier, or two years earlier, the result
would have been the same.

The insurance would have ended and

STUART would have received a credit for unearned premium.
The Contract and the Certificate of Insurance were both
clear, consistent, and unambiguous as to the events which would
trigger the termination of the insurance.

STUART only saw those

documents before it brought suit.
a.

STUART sgw the Master Ppliqy only after the
lawsuit was commenced.

Since the lawsuit was filed, STUART learned that the
Certificate of Insurance was not the actual policy, and STUART
obtained a copy of the policy from JOHN DEERE*s counsel in
connection with requests for admission which were sent to STUART'S
counsel (R. 54).
In spite of the fact that STUART never saw the Master
Policy, it is now claiming that an amendment to the Master Policy
which amendment was formalized in January, 1989, has removed the
termination language from the Master Policy.

This amendment was

not contained in the original version of the Master Policy, which
was attached to JOHN DEERE's memorandum supporting its motion for
summary judgment (R. 45, 49). The original policy was attached to
the October 13, 1988 Affidavit of Howard J. Payne (R. 45). After
filing its motion for summary judgment, JOHN DEERE realized that
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the form of the policy attached to Mr. Payne's original affidavit
was not completely current, and so JOHN DEERE caused the Amended
Affidavit of Mr. Payne, dated April 10, 1989, to be filed in
support of the summary judgment motion (R. 63-92).

This amended

affidavit contained the January, 1989, formalized amendment to the
Master Policy.
It was not until Mr. Payne's amended affidavit had been
filed, and after JOHN DEERE consented to allow STUART additional
time to respond (R. 57), that STUART noticed and attempted to take
advantage of the amendment when it finally filed its Memorandum in
Opposition and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.
The focus of STUART'S argument is found in the
Endorsement dated 1 September, 1983 (R. 81). The Endorsement
states it amends the "Attachment of Insurance" provision contained
earlier in the Policy.

The two paragraphs are set forth herein so

that comparison is easy for this Court.

The original policy's

Attachment of Insurance provision reads as follows:
The insurance hereby provided shall apply only to those
items of merchandise on which, according to the Named
Insured's records, insurance was purchased at the time
the financing agreement was made and as respects each
such item, the insurance shall attach as of (a) the time
the Additional Insured takes possession thereof or (b)
the time of execution and acceptance of the note,
whichever occurs first. This insurance terminates when
the actual maturity date of the note is reached or the
date on which the security interest of John Deere in said
equipment terminates, whichever first occurs.
(R. 68). The amended paragraph, incorporating coverage for
non-financed property, reads as follows:
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The insurance hereby provided shall apply only to those
items of financed merchandise 2£ additional security on
which, according to the Named Insured's records,
insurance was purchased at the time the financing
agreement was made. As respects each item of financed
merchandise, the insurance shall attach as of (a) the
time the additional Insured takes possession thereof or
(b) the time of acceptance of the note by John Deere,
whichever occurs first. &£ respects each item fif.
additional security, the insurance shall attach as of the
time of acceptance of the note by John Deere.
(R. 81) (emphasis added).

Importantly, the Endorsement also

states that M[n]othing herein contained shall be held to vary,
waive, alter, or extend any of the terms, conditions, agreements
or declarations of the policy, other than as herein stated.H
(R. 81).
4.

Under Accepted Rules Of Contract Interpretation. The
Certificate Of Insurance Is Part Of The Policy.

This Court should determine that the insurance agreement
is not ambiguous, in light of the language contained in the
Insurance Policy, the Contract, and the Certificate of Insurance.
Contrary to STUART'S assertion that an issue of fact exists
regarding the intent of the parties (STUART Brief at p. 13),
whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, which this
Court may decide without particular deference to the lower court's
conclusions.

Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah

1983); Jones v. Hinkle. 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980)
(••Interpretation of a written contract is ordinarily a question of
law, and this Court need not defer to the trial court's
construction.-)

Therefore, this Court should ignore STUART'S

attempts to have the matter remanded, and affirm the lower court's
decision for the reasons stated herein.
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This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have stated the
general rule of contract interpretation in many cases.

That rule

is as follows:
[I]f the language of the contract is such that the
intention of the parties is clearly and unequivocally
expressed, it must be enforced according to its terms.
But conversely, if there is a basis in its language upon
which the parties reasonably could have a
misunderstanding with respect to its intent, then
extraneous evidence can be received and considered to
ascertain it. Moreover, in making that determination,
± M court is not bound by any single provision QJL
expression, bui Should look £fi £ M whole CQntrgct M
its

purpose.
Winoets, Inc. v. Bitters. 500 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Utah 1972)
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

STUART cannot claim a

"misunderstanding*1 with respect to the intent of JOHN DEERE and
Deere & Company.

And certainly STUART can claim no

misunderstanding of an amendment which did not exist until 10
months after its date of loss.
Rather than look solely to the amendment of the
Attachment of Insurance provision (R. 81) as STUART suggests, this
Court should carefully consider the "whole" contract and its
purpose, to interpret it.
Before looking at the whole contract, this Court should
also note its definition of "ambiguous", as used less than two
years ago in C.J. Realty. Inc. v. Willey. 758 P.2d 923 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).

In that case, this Court stated,

A contract is considered ambiguous if 'the words
used to express the meaning and intention of the parties
are insufficient in a sense that the contract may be
understood to reach two or more plausible meanings.1

-24-

Id. at 928 (citation omitted).

Applying this definition of

ambiguous to the insurance agreement as a whole, there are no Mtwo
or more plausible meanings" suggested by any words in the
agreement.

Rather, all of the writings, taken together,

unambiguously state that the insurance coverage ends upon STUART'S
discharge of indebtedness and termination of the security interest
in the Backhoe, both of which took place on February 5, 1988. The
January, 1989 amendment never purported to change the termination
language contained in the Certificate of Insurance.
This Court should not limit its review of the writings
solely to the Master Policy to determine the intent of the
parties.

The Certificate of Insurance and the Contract also

constitute writings which set forth and describe the terms of the
contract contemplated by the parties at the time STUART purchased
the Backhoe.

Utah law is clear that other writings should be

included in insurance contracts.

H

As a general rule:

endorsements, riders, marginal references, and other writings
which constitute a part of the contract of insurance are to be
read and construed with the policy proper."

St. Paul Fire &

Marine Ins. v. Commercial Union Assurance, 606 P.2d 1206, 1208
(Utah 1980) (footnote omitted).
a.

This Court should ignore the Certificate's
disclaimer lgnqugqe.

STUART may argue that the Certificate of Insurance should
not be considered part of the policy.

Arguably, the Certificate

of Insurance is not part of the contract because of some language
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it contains.

The Certificate of Insurance states it His not a

contract of Insurance and [Deere and Company] does not undertake
any responsibility as an insurer.

The rights of all parties are

governed solely by the aforementioned policy, issued by the JOHN
DEERE INSURANCE COMPANY."

(R. 9). For the reasons set forth

below, this Court may disregard this language.

However, even if

this Court chooses to apply this language, it simply makes clear
that the Certificate was not the entire agreement, that Deere &
Company was not the insurer, and that the Master Policy, to which
JOHN DEERE was a party, is the "policy proper" as the meaning of
that phrase was implied by the court in the St. Paul case, supra.
STUART is hard put to suggest that the Certificate of
Insurance can have no role in the insurance agreement's
interpretation.

It is the Certificate of Insurance, and not the

Master Policy, which sets forth the insurance's effective date of
December 20, 1983 and expiration date of April 1, 1988, upon which
STUART relies (STUART Brief at 4, 18-19, 21).
b*

The majority rule requires inclusion of the
Certificate in the policy.

JOHN DEERE's research found no Utah caselaw on the
subject of whether a certificate of insurance may be considered
part of the insurance contract.

However, courts in other states

have considered the issue and suggest that the Certificate of
Insurance should be considered part of the insurance agreement.
In Fittro v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co.. 757
P.2d 1374 (Wash. 1988) (en banc), the Supreme Court of Washington
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recognized the majority rule that "the coverage provisions stated
in a certificate of coverage furnished to an insured by the
insurer takes precedence over conflicting terms in the master
policy.-

Icl. at 1376 (citations omitted).

This Court need not go

even that far, since there are no conflicting terms. As amended,
the Master Policy is silent on termination.
STUART may also argue the disclaimer language in the
Certificate of Insurance in this case should take it out of the
majority rule.

The disclaimer language does not take it out of

the majority rule.

The Fittro case had a similar problem, since

the certificate of insurance in that case expressly stated that
the certificate "was not an insurance policy and did not alter or
amend the provisions of the policy.H

Jjl. at 1377. The Fittro

court addressed this directly and stated:
Such disclaimer language should not be given effect when
the certificate is issued under statutory mandate and is
the only document the insured is likely to see before
incurring expenses for covered injuries. A disclaimer is
standard boilerplate language in certificates. A clear
majority of those courts that have considered similar
disclaimer provisions in other certificates have not
given effect to the disclaimer and have instead enforced
the broader coverage suggested in the certificate.
2&. (emphasis by court)(citations omitted).

Applying the Fittro

analysis to this case, the Certificate of Insurance should be
considered part of the policy, and its provisions regarding
termination should be given effect.

This is especially true where

there are no policy provisions which conflict with the certificate
language.

The amended Attachment of Insurance provision (R. 81)

is now merely silent on the point of termination.
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c.

Public Policy reasons strongly support
inclusion of the Certificate in the policy.

As a matter of public policy, this Court should adopt the
majority rule that in situations where the insured is likely only
to see the certificate of insurance, the provisions in the
certificate should be given effect, whether those provisions
conflict with the master policy or not.
consideration here is one of reliance.

The obvious policy
"[T]he certificates of

insurance are a part of the contract of insurance and . . . an
individual insured ha[s] the right to expect the coverage
described in the certificate where a change in the master policy
was not reflected in the individual's certificate of insurance."
Martin v. Crown Life Ins. Co,, 658 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Mont. 1983).
d.

STUART cannot claim anv prejudice bv inclusion
of the Certificate in the policy.

In the case of STUART, no injustice results in holding
STUART to the Certificate of Insurance's provisions regarding
termination, since STUART never saw the Master Policy before the
lawsuit (R. 206). Indeed, the actual writing by which the
Attachment of Insurance paragraph was amended did not exist prior
to January, 1989 (R. 129). As a matter of public policy, and
because STUART is not prejudiced, this Court should adopt the
majority rule that certificates of insurance are part of the
insurance contract, and that if a conflict exists between the
certificate and the master policy, the certificate should apply.

-28-

5.

Even Without The Certificate Of Insurance, The
Master Policy Should Be Read To End Coverage Upon
STUART'S Pavoff.

Even if this Court determines that the Certificate of
Insurance is not part of the insurance contract/ the Master Policy
provides for termination/ in spite of the amendment to the
Attachment of Insurance provision.
The amendment is merely silent on the subject of
termination.

The lower court specifically referenced the language

of the Endorsement which states, "Nothing herein contained shall
be held to vary, waive# alter, or extend any of the terms,
conditions, agreements or declarations of the policy, other that
as stated herein."

(R. 81, 196)

(Emphasis added).

The fact is

that nothing in the Endorsement was "stated" about the termination
language contained in the original version.

Paragraph 22 of the

Master Policy (R. 74) makes clear that since the Endorsement did
not expressly conflict or vary with the original Instalment Sales
Floater, the termination language was not affected by the
Endorsement.

Therefore, as a matter of law, the termination

language remained in the Master Policy.

To the extent that it is

not inconsistent with the Attachment of Insurance provision
contained in the endorsement, the terms of the original Attachment
of Insurance provision, including the provision terminating the
policy when the note matures or when the security interest of
Deere & Company in the equipment terminates, remained in force.
STUART'S argument to the contrary contradicts both the clear
language of the policy and elementary rules of contract
interpretation.
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The insurance agreement is unambiguous, and this Court
should affirm the lower court's determination that coverage ended
when STUART paid the Backhoe off,
C.

EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE INSURANCE AGREEMENT IS
AMBIGUOUS, THE UNDISPUTED PAROL, EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN THIS
CASE IS THAT THE TERMINATION LANGUAGE IN THE ORIGINAL
ATTACHMENT OF INSURANCE PROVISION WAS OMITTED ONLY BY CLERICAL
ERROR, AND THAT THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES ALWAYS HAS BEEN, AND
CONTINUES TO BE, THAT PAYOFF OF THE BACKHOE ENDS COVERAGE,
Even if this Court finds that the Insurance Policy is

ambiguous on the point of whether paying off the debt on the
Backhoe and receiving a refund of the unearned premium result in
an automatic end of coverage/ there is no reason to remand the
case back to the trial court for taking of parol evidence.

This

Court should affirm the lower court's decision for the reason that
it implicitly found that the Policy was ambiguous, and that parol
evidence was proper and necessary to determine the meaning of the
Policy.

That parol evidence was contained in the affidavit of

Deborah Kamenetzky (R. 196-197).

STUART has conceded in its

Brief, and rightly so, that if a court determines a contract is
ambiguous it may go on to consider parol evidence (STUART Brief
at 13).
The fact that Deere & Company and JOHN DEERE have always
intended that the insurance coverage as to additional insured
would automatically end upon payoff is not disputed.

The fact

that the termination language was omitted from the amended
Attachment of Insurance paragraph in the Master Policy by clerical
error is not disputed.
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1.

STUART Cannot Dispute The Parol Evidence,

STUART has produced no evidence to suggest that the
parties ever intended anything other than what STUART was told by
the Contract and by the Certificate of Insurance.

In fact, it is

also undisputed that while a clerical error occurred in the Master
Policy, Ms. Kamenetzky made modifications to the form of
certificates of insurance sent to Deere & Company customers, and
those have not changed (R. 129). From January 1, 1982, every
certificate of insurance issued to Utah resident purchasers of
John Deere equipment under the Insurance Policy has included the
same termination language (R. 129).
STUART has waived its rights to challenge Ms.
Kamenetzky's veracity since it never moved pursuant to Rule 56(f)
to conduct any discovery of JOHN DEERE for the purpose of
marshalling evidence to oppose JOHN DEERE's summary judgment
motion.

Just such a marshalling is what the U.S. Supreme Court

has required since its Celotex decision, supra.

Similarly, this

Court should not allow STUART to come forward now to complain
about an affidavit it had for weeks before the hearing on this
matter took place.
a.

STUART'S failure to move to strike the
Kamenetzky Affidavit waives any evidentiary
objections thereto.

STUART waived its rights to complain about the Kamenetzky
Affidavit when it never moved to strike the affidavit.

Even if

consideration of the Kamenetzky Affidavit were central to the
trial court's ruling, the trial court's consideration of it was
proper and justified.
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STUART had the Kamenetzky Affidavit for weeks prior to
the hearing and never moved the trial court to strike it.

The

decisions of this Court and of the Utah Supreme Court make clear
that a party's failure to object to or move to strike an affidavit
constitutes a waiver of formal or evidentiary defects in the
affidavit.

Hobelman Motors, Inc. v. Allred, 685 P.2d 544, 546

(Utah 1984); Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659
P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983); Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877, 880
(Utah 1979); Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 498 P.2d 352, 353-354
(Utah 1972); Fox v. Allstate Ins. Co., 453 P.2d 701, 702-703 (Utah
1969); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d
42, 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
For the reason that STUART never moved to strike the
Kamenetzky Affidavit prior to or at the hearing, it was not error
for the trial court to consider it.
D.

BECAUSE THE POLICY TERMINATED OF ITS OWN ACCORD AND BY ITS
OWN TERMS, AND BECAUSE JOHN DEERE DID NOT CANCEL THE POLICY,
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 70C-6-304 AND 31A-21-303(2) UTAH
CODE ANNOT. DO NOT APPLY
STUART suggests at page 21 of its Brief that because JOHN

DEERE did not mail a notice of cancellation to STUART prior to the
Backhoe's burning up, the provisions of Sections 70C-6-304 and
31A-21-303(2) require that the insurance agreement remain in
force.

Neither of these sections is applicable to these facts for

the reason that JOHN DEERE did not cancel this insurance.

The

unilateral act of STUART in paying off the indebtedness, alone,
ended coverage.
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1.

Both Sections Contemplate Cancellation, Which Did
Not Take Place,

Section 70C-6-304 reads, in pertinent part, that "A
creditor may not request cancellation of a policy of property or
liability insurance except after the debtor's default or in
accordance with a written authorization by the debtor, . . ."
STUART did not set forth as an undisputed fact, nor can it, that
John Deere & Company, as STUART's creditor, requested JOHN DEERE
to "cancel" the insurance.

This is an express condition precedent

to the applicability of this section.
For similar reasons, Section 31A-21-303 does not apply.
It states, in pertinent part, that "no insurance policy may be
cancelled by the insurer prior to the expiration of the agreed
term or one year from the effective date of the policy or renewal,
whichever is less. . . . "
added).

Section 31A-21-303(2)(a) (emphasis

The "agreed term" herein was for the period during which

STUART owed money on the Backhoe.

That term ended prior to the

loss.
a.

The statutes' ppliqi^g flon't apply h$re.

The policy reasons behind these two statutes are
obvious.

If an insurer decides to cancel a policy for reasons

unknown to the insured, the insured is entitled to some notice to
protect itself.

Those policy reasons do not apply when an

additional insured does the very acts which it was told up front
would result in automatic termination, without notice.

STUART was

told that the terms of this policy call for termination upon
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payoff^ and STUART elected to keep the insurance under those
terms.

It also goes without saying that the refund of the

unearned premium which STUART received when it made the payoff
does not entitle it to further insurance coverage.
2.

Other Courts Have Held That Expiration Is Not

Cancellation.
Only seven months ago, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas in the case of Lawrence v. John Deere
Ins. Co., Case No. 87-6108, (W.D. Ark. June 19, 1989), addressed
the identical issue of "cancellation" versus "termination" in a
case involving an early pay-off (R. 167-175).

In that case/ the

court relied upon the language of the certificate of insurance (R.
170) and ruled that Arkansas, as well as other states, had
"recognized the distinction between cancellation of a policy and
the expiration of a policy by its own terms." (R. 173). The court
went on to cite Farmers Insurance Company of Arkansas v. Hall, 567
S.W.2d 296 (Ark. 1978), Morey v. Educator & Executive Insurers,
Inc.,

342 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1976) overruled on other grounds,

DeBose v. Travelers Insurance Co.. 451 «.E. 2d 753, 754 <Ohit>
1983), Anthony v. National Grange Mutual Insurance Co. 309 A.2d
919 (N.H. 1973) and Shiaras v. Chupp, 334 N.E.2d 129 (111. 1975)
in support of the proposition that a policy's expiring by its own
terms is not the equivalent of cancellation (R. 174).
The Lawrence case was appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the judgment of the
lower court.

(Copy of Eighth Circuit decision appended hereto as
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Addendum H A M .)

Applying the rationale of the above cases and the

plain meaning of "cancel" to these facts, this Court should find
that JOHN DEERE did not cancel the insurance policy as to STUART.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Respondents respectfully
request that this Court affirm the judgment of the Second District
Court.
Respectfully submitted,

Mark O. Morris
Attorneys for JOHN DEERE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant/Respondent
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ADDENDUM A

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

NO. 8 9 - 2 1 9 6

Rex Lawrence,

*
*

Appellant,
v.
John Deere Insurance Company,

*
*
*
*
*

Appeal from the United States
District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas.

*

Appellee.

Submitted:
Filed:

*

November 20, 1989
December 15, 1989

Before McMILLlAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.
Rex Lawrence appeals from the district court's1 entry of
judgment, after a bench trial, in favor of John Deere Insurance
company in this diversity action brought by Lawrence to collect on
a claim he filed with the insurance company. We affirm.
On October 24, 1S84, Lawrence purchased a John Deere 640 Log
Skidder from an authorized John Deere dealer. He arranged to
finance the purchase with John Deere Industrial Equipment Company
under a Variable Rate Loan Contract-Security Agreement. Under the
terms of the contract, Lawrence was required to obtain physical

Vhe Honorable Oren Harris, Senior Judge, United
District Court for the Western District of Arkansas.

States

damage insurance on the log-skidder.
He elected to have - the
equipment company purchase the insurance from John Deere Insurance
Company, and was thereby able to finance the cost of the insurance
as well. The $8,424.00 insurance premium was paid by the equipment
company to the insurance company in a lump sum at the commencement
of the contract.
The total amount financed was $80,031.00, which was to be paid
in thirty-six monthly installments of $2,734.66 beginning December
31, 1984. The loan contract provided that the insurance would
terminate if the indebtedness was discharged or at the end of the
term of the contract, which would have been November 1, 1987 if the
entire thirty-six monthc were needed to pay off the loan. The
contract also provided that any refunds of returned insurance
premiums would be applied toward existing indebtedness.
Because of the variable interest rate, as of September 1,
1987, the amount due on the loan was only $1,134.38. Lawrence
received a statement dated September 10, 1987, showing a contract
payoff amount of $897.56• This amount was computed by taking the
unearned insurance premium into account, which was to be applied
to the loan when the last payment from Lawrence was received. On
September 29, 1987, the equipment company received Lawrence's
payment.
On the same day the unearned insurance premium was
credited to his account, discharging the debt.
On October 5, 1987, the log skidder caught fire, sustaining
over $23,000.00 in damages. Lawrence filed a claim for the loss.
The insurance company refused to pay, informing Lawrence that the
insurance had terminated on September 29th when the indebtedness
was discharged.
Lawrence brought suit claiming the insurance
company unilaterally cancelled the policy, thereby creating the
refund with which to discharge the debt, which he argued the
company could not do without notice. In the alternative, he argued

2

that the terms of the contract were ambiguous and therefore should
be construed to provide coverage for thirty-six months.
The district court, noting the distinction under Arkansas law
between cancellation of an insurance policy and expiration by its
own terms, found that the insurance coverage was not cancelled, but
that it terminated. The court also concluded that it was clear
from the contract that the insurance automatically terminated when
either the indebtedness was discharged or at the end of thirty-six
months, whichever occurred first.
After careful consideration of the record and the arguments
of the partiesr we find no deficiency in the district court1 s
analysis of the case. See Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v. T.ri-State
Ins. Co,. 827 F.2d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 1987) (interpretation of
forum's state law made by resident district court judge overturned
only if fundamentally deficient in analysis, without a reasonable
basis, or contrary to reported state court opinion. Accordingly,
we affirm on the basis of its thorough and well reasoned opinion.
&eg 8th Cir* R. 14.
A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
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78-2a-3

78-2a-3, Court of Appeals jurisdiction,
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of
agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a
criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including but not limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April
25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a)
and (b) in Subsection (1); inserted "resulting
from formal adjudicative proceedings" in Subsection (2)(a); substituted "state agencies" for
"state and local agencies" in Subsection (2)(a);
substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings
of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a);
deleted "notwithstanding any other provision
of law" at the end of Subsection <2Ka); inserted
Subsection (b); redesignated former Subsections (2Kb) to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to
(2)(i); added "except those from the small
claims department of a circuit court" at the end

of Subsection (2)(d); and made minor stylistic
changes.
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 210, effective April 25,1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsection
(2)(h) as Subsection (2)(i).
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chapter 248, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection
(2)(a), rewrote the phrase before "except"
which had read "the final orders and decrees of
state and local agencies or appeals from the
district court review of them"; deleted "notwithstanding any other provision of law" at the
end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted present Subsection (2Kb); designated former Subsections
(2Kb) to (2Kh) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and
substituted "first degree or capital felony" for
"first or capital degree felony" in present Subsection (2)(f).
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This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

Cross-References. — Composition and jurisdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15,
39-6-16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
stitutional right in the trial. Gomm v. Cook,
754 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

ANALYSIS

Habeas corpus proceedings.
Post-conviction review.
Scope.
Cited.
Habeas corpus proceedings.
The language of Subsection (2)(g) is sufficiently broad to include those cases where a
criminal conviction is involved in a habeas corpus proceeding challenging extradition.
Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).

Scope.
This statute defines the outermost limits of
appellate jurisdiction, allowing the Court of
Appeals to review agency decisions only when
the legislature expressly authorizes a right of
review. It is not a catchall provision authorizing the court to review the orders of every administrative agency for which there is no statute specifically creating a right to judicial review. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Appeals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Post-conviction review.
Post-conviction review may be used to attack
a conviction in the event of an obvious injustice
or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a con-

Cited in Scientific Academy of Hair Design,
Inc. v. Bowen, 738 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App.
1987); In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).

CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3-1.
78-3-2.
78-3-3.
78-3-4.

Section
78-3-15, 78-3-16. Repealed.
78-3-16.5. Fees for filing and other services
or actions.
78-3-17.
Repealed.
78-3-17.5. Application of savings accruing to
counties.
78-3-18.
Judicial Administration Act —
Short title.
78-3-20.
Definitions.
78-3-21.
Judicial Council — Creation —
Members — Terms and election
— Responsibilities — Reports.
78-3-24.
Court administrator — Powers,
duties, and responsibilities.
78-3-27.
Annual judicial conference.
78-3-30.
Duties of the clerk of the district
court.

Repealed.
Repealed.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases
to circuit court — Appeals.
78-3-6.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
78-3-11.5. State District Court Administrative System — Primary and secondary county locations.
78-3-12.
Repealed.
78-3-12.5. Costs of system.
78-3-13.
Repealed.
78-3-13.4. Counties joining court system —
Procedure — Facilities — Salaries.
78-3-14.
Repealed.
78-3-14.5. Allocation of district court fees
and fines.

78-3-1. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 115, § 8 repeals
§ 78-3-1 as amended by Laws 1982, ch. 21, § 1
relating to the number of district judges, effec-
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tive April 25, 1988. For present comparable
provisions, see § 78-1-2.2.

ADDENDUM C
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31A-21-303

31A-21-303. Termination of insurance policies by insurers,
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, in other statutes, or by
rule under Subsection (l)(c), this section applies to all policies of insurance other than life and disability insurance and annuities, if they are
issued on forms which are subject to filing and approval under Subsection
31A-21-201Q).
(b) A policy may provide terms more favorable to insureds than this
section requires.
(c) The commissioner may by rule totally or partially exempt from this
section classes of insurance policies in which the insureds do not need
protection against arbitrary or unannounced termination.
(d) The rights provided by this section are in addition to and do not
prejudice any other rights the insureds may have at common law or under
other statutes.
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(c), no insurance policy may be
cancelled by the insurer prior to the expiration of the agreed term or one
year from the effective date of the policy or renewal, whichever is less,
except for failure to pay a premium when due or on grounds stated in the
policy. As used in this subsection, "grounds" means:
(i) material misrepresentation;
(ii) substantial change in the risk assumed, unless the insurer
should reasonably have foreseen the change or contemplated the risk
when entering into the contract;
(iii) substantial breaches of contractual duties, conditions, or warranties;
(iv) attainment of the age specified as the terminal age for coverage, in which case the insurer may cancel by notice under Subsection
(2)(b), accompanied by a tender of proportional return of premium; or
(v) in the case of automobile insurance, revocation or suspension of
the driver's license of the named insured or any other person who
customarily drives the car.
(b) Not sooner than 30 days after the delivery or first class mailing of a
written notice to the policyholder, the cancellation provided by Subsection (2)(a), except cancellation for nonpayment of premium, is effective.
Cancellation for nonpayment of premium is effective no sooner than ten
days after delivery or first class mailing. Notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premium shall include a statement of the reason for cancellation. Subsection (6) applies to the notice required for other grounds of
cancellation.
(c) Subsections (2)(a) and (b) do not apply to any insurance contract
that has not been previously renewed if the contract has been in effect
less than 60 days when the notice of cancellation is mailed or delivered.
No cancellation under this subsection is effective until at least (10) days
after the delivery to the insured of a written notice of cancellation. If the
notice is sent by first class mail, postage prepaid, to the insured at his last
known address, delivery is considered accomplished after the passing,
since the mailing date, of the mailing time specified in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Policy cancellations subject to this subsection are not
subject to the procedures described in Subsection (6).
Ill

31A-21-303

INSURANCE CODE

(3) A policy may be issued for a term longer than one year or for an indefinite term, with a clause providing for cancellation by the insurer by giving
notice as provided in Subsection (4)(b)(i) 30 days prior to any anniversary
date.
(4) (a) Subject to Subsections (2), (3), (4)(b), and (4)(c), a policyholder has a
right to have the policy renewed, on the terms then being applied by the
insurer to similar risks, for an additional period of time equivalent to the
expiring term if the agreed term is one year or less, or for one year if the
agreed term is longer than one year.
(b) The right to renewal under Subsection (4)(a) is extinguished if:
(i) at least 30 days prior to the policy expiration or anniversary
date a notice of intention not to renew the policy beyond the agreed
expiration or anniversary date is delivered or sent by first class mail
by the insurer to the policyholder at the policyholder's last known
address;
(ii) not more than 45 nor less than 14 days prior to the due date of
the renewal premium, the insurer delivers or sends by first class mail
a notice to the policyholder at the policyholder's last known address,
clearly stating the renewal premium, how it may be paid, and that
failure to pay the renewal premium by the due date extinguishes the
policyholder's right to renewal;
(iii) the policyholder has accepted replacement coverage, or has
requested or agreed to nonrenewal; or
(iv) the policy is expressly designated as nonrenewable.
(5) (a) Subject to Subsection (5)(b), if the insurer offers or purports to renew
the policy, but on less favorable terms or at higher rates, the new terms or
rates take effect on the renewal date if the insurer delivered or sent by
first class mail to the policyholder notice of the new terms or rates at least
30 days prior to the expiration date of the prior policy. If the insurer did
not give this prior notification to the policyholder, the new terms or rates
do not take effect until 30 days after the notice is delivered or sent by first
class mail, in which case the policyholder may elect to cancel the renewal
policy at any time during the 30-day period. Return premiums or additional premium charges shall be calculated proportionately on the basis
that the old rates apply.
(b) Subsection (5)(a) does not apply if the only change in terms that is
adverse to the policyholder is a rate increase generally applicable to the
class of business to which the policy belongs, a rate increase resulting
from a classification change based on the altered nature or extent of the
risk insured against, or a policy form change made to make the form
consistent with Utah law.
(6) If a notice of cancellation or nonrenewal under Subsection (2Kb) does
not state with reasonable precision the facts on which the insurer's decision is
based, the insurer shall send by first class mail or deliver that information
within ten working days after receipt of a written request by the policyholder.
This notice is not effective unless it contains information about the policyholder's right to make the request.
(7) If a risk-sharing plan under Section 31A-2-214 exists for the kind of
coverage provided by the insurance being cancelled or nonrenewed, no notice
of cancellation or nonrenewal required under Subsection (2)(b) or (4)(b)(i) is
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effective unless it contains instructions to the policyholder for applying for
insurance through the available risk-sharing plan.
(8) There is no liability on the part of, and no cause of action against, any
insurer, its authorized representatives, agents, employees, or any other person furnishing to the insurer information relating to the reasons for cancellation or nonrenewal or for any statement made or information given by them
in complying or enabling the insurer to comply with this section unless actual
malice is proved by clear and convincing evidence.
(9) This section does not alter any common law right of contract rescission
for material misrepresentation.
History: C. 1953, 31A-21-303, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 26; 1986, ch. 204, § 144;
1987, ch. 91, § 47; 1987, ch. 95, § 26.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 91, made a minor change in
phraseology in Subsection (7).
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 95, effective March 16, 1987, substituted "30" for "20"
in the first sentence of Subsection (2Kb).

This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Compiler's Notes. — Although referred to
in Subsection (4)(a), as enacted and amended,
this section contains no Subsection (4)(c).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Renewal.
—Nonpayment.
As a matter of law, an insurer did not waive
its right to refuse a late renewal payment and

deny coverage, by its conduct in previously accepting a late installment payment. Clarke v.
American Concept Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 470 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Cancellation of compulsory or "financial responsibility" automobile insurance,
44 A.L.R.4th 13.
Fidelity bond termination clause on taking
over of insured by another business entity: construction and effect, 44 A.L.R.4th 1195.

Validity and construction of automobile insurance provision or statute automatically terminating coverage when insured obtains another policy providing similar coverage, 61
A.L.R.4th 1130.

31A-21-304. Special cancellation provisions.
Whether or not Section 31A-21-303 is also applicable:
(1) Section 31A-21-305 applies to cancellation on request of a premium
finance company;
(2) Section 70C-6-304 applies to cancellation upon request of a creditor;
and
(3) Sections 41-12a-404 and 41-12a-405 apply to the cancellation or
other termination of insurance coverage or of a surety bond after the
insurer or surety has provided a certificate of insurance or suretyship to
the Department of Public Safety.
History: C. 1953, 31A-21-304, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 26; 1986, ch. 204, § 145;
1987, ch. 91, § 48.

Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, in Subsection (2), substituted "70C-6304" for "70B-4-304."
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70C-6-303. Liability insurance.
A creditor may not contract for or receive a separate charge for insurance
against liability arising out of the ownership or use of property related to the
credit transaction, unless the insurance covers a significant risk of liability.
History: C. 1953, 70C-6-303, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 159, § 8.

70C-6-304. Cancellation by creditor.
A creditor may not request cancellation of a policy of property or liability
insurance except after the debtor's default or in accordance with a written
authorization by the debtor, and in either case the cancellation does not take
effect until written notice is delivered to the debtor or mailed to him at his
address as stated by him. The notice shall state that the policy may be cancelled on a date not less than ten days after the notice is delivered, or, if the
notice is mailed, not less than 13 days after it is mailed.
History: C. 1953, 70C-6-304, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 159, § 8.

CHAPTER 7
REMEDIES AND PENALTIES
Part
1. Limitation on Creditors' Remedies.
2. Debtors' Remedies.

PART 1
LIMITATION ON CREDITORS' REMEDIES
Section
70C-7-101. Restriction on deficiency judgments in consumer credit sales.
70C-7-102. No garnishment before judgment.
70C-7-103. Definitions — Limitation on garnishment.
70C-7-104. No discharge from employment
for garnishment.

Section
70C-7-105. Extortionate extensions of credit.
70C-7-106. Unconscionabihty.
70C-7-107. Notice of negative credit report
required.

70C-7-101. Restriction on deficiency judgments in consumer credit sales.
(1) If a seller repossesses or voluntarily accepts the surrender or return of
goods which were the subject of a consumer credit sale and in which the seller
has a security interest to secure a debt arising from the sale of goods or
services or a combined sale of goods and services, and the cash price of the sale
was $3,000 or less, any debt remaining from the sale shall be fully satisfied
and the seller has no further obligation to the buyer with respect to the goods
taken or accepted.
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